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Abstract 
 
This paper aims to examine the distorted valuations of internet companies during the dot.com bubble. 
The analysis is performed through a clinical study of Tiscali, the most known Italian internet company 
at the time. First, its IPO is presented, underlining the presence of the three typical phenomena: the 
decision to go public during a hot issue market, the initial underpricing, and the long run 
underperformance. Second, a content analysis of the reports issued by analysts in the period 1999-
2001 shows the most common mistakes in using relative market valuation techniques. Third, an event 
study analysis shows the market reaction following acquisition deals announcements was often driven 
by irrational exuberance during the internet craze, but also that after the bubble burst the market 
eventually understood analysts over optimism. Other behavioral biases like overconfidence, but also 
heuristics  like  anchoring  are  discussed  in  the  paper,  as  well  as  the  need  for  analysts’  to  insert  in  their  
toolbox new instruments provided by the behavioral finance literature.** 
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1 Introduction 
 
Internet   companies’   valuation   has   attracted   an  
enormous interest during the Internet bubble of end of 
the 1990s – beginning of 2000s both among market 
participants and academics. At its peak (March, 
2000), the valuation of these firms reached 
extraordinary high levels, competing with older and 
more established companies. At the time, stock 
markets saw their value rapidly increase mainly thank 
to the growth in the new Internet sector.15 Large 
positive stock market reactions followed the 
announcements of name changes of corporations to 
Internet   related  dotcom  names.  This   “dotcom”  effect  
originated cumulative abnormal returns up to 74% 
over the ten days surrounding the announcement day 
(Cooper et al., 2000).  
After the bubble, financial analysts have been 
accused of having overstated the value of internet 
companies. This paper mainly aims to examine the 
distortions   that   affected   analysts’   valuations   during  
the  “dotcom”  craze. 
In highlight the most common mistakes 
committed by analysts in their reports on internet 
companies, it is possible to trace them back to the 
                                                          
15 The stocks belonging to this sector were valued 35 times 
their aggregate revenues and had a target price/earnings 
ratio as high as 605. 
most popular biases examined in the behavioral 
finance literature. Analysts had a major role in 
spreading the so-called   “irrational   exuberance”  
(Shiller, 2000) that affected stock markets in those 
years. 
While excessive optimism and overconfidence in 
their skills may have caused such distorted valuations, 
also potential conflicts of interests partly explain such 
distortions.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  while  analysts’  role  is  
to issue valuable information to their clients, at the 
same time they work for investment banks that do 
business with the covered companies.  
Analysts, however, are not the only focus of this 
paper since also the stock market reaction, thus 
investors’  behavior,  is  considered. 
The paper is a clinical study on Tiscali – the 
most representative Italian internet company at the 
time of the dotcom bubble – that has been analyzed 
between 1999 and 2001. During this period, the 
company reached its highest market capitalization (on 
March, 10 2000) and expanded through a series of 
acquisitions of the most active internet companies in 
Europe. 
The paper is organized as follows: section 2 
present a brief survey of the relevant literature; 
section 3 describes the database and the methodology 
used  that  includes  both  a  content  analysis  of  analysts’  
reports issued on the company, as well as an event 
study of the market reaction to major corporate 
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events; section 4 presents the results obtained through 
the   analysis   of  Tiscali’s   IPO,   the   content   analysis   of  
reports and the event study to measure the market 
reaction; section 5 concludes. 
 
2 Literature review 
 
Studies in the literature deal with the valuation of 
internet companies and the role of analysts in the 
dotcom bubble from different angles. Since during 
that period several high tech companies benefited 
from the market upward phase to go public, many 
studies analyzing the internet bubble regarded the IPO 
process.  
Tiscali’s  IPO  is  the  most  emblematic  example  of  
the   impact   of   the   “new   economy”   on   the   Italian  
market. The analysis that follows deals with its listing 
on the Italian Stock Exchange (Borsa Italiana), with 
particular regard to its timing and to the initial 
underpricing on the first trading day. Furthermore, the 
analysis of the medium term performance has been 
carried out.  
Thus,   the   three   typical   “regularities”   related   to  
IPOs – hot issue markets, initial underpricing, long 
run underperformance (Ritter, 1984) – have been 
analyzed using both the traditional approach (Brealey, 
Myers and Allen, 2010) as well as the behavioral one 
(Shefrin, 2006).  
In IPOs, the degree of asymmetric information 
between the management of the company and 
investors is very high. In case of uncertainty, 
investors tend to rely on heuristics, i.e., rules of thumb 
that help in taking decisions. In case of asymmetric 
information, the so-called “bandwagon   effect”  
(Welch, 1992) can take place in the market. The latter 
effect,  also  known  as  “information  cascade”,  refers  to  
investors’  preference   to  buy   the   stocks  of  companies  
that recently went public, and that have already 
attracted   other   investors’   attention,   i.e.,   that   are  
considered   “hot”.   Relying on the behavior of the 
crowd, rather than on their own judgements, investors 
are able to minimize the potential future regret that 
they may feel in case of the choice of the stock turns 
out to be erroneous.  
The   expression   “hot   market”   refers   to   a   period 
when valuations are irrationally iper-optimistic. In 
these periods, the average first month performance of 
IPOs is particularly high (Ibbotson and Jaffe, 1975). 
IPOs usually tend to concentrate in periods of high 
initial underpricing – i.e., the fact that the offer price 
is below the closing price of the first day of trading 
(Purnanandam and Swaminathan, 2004) – creating a 
“windows   of   opportunity”   to   go   public   (Loughran,  
Ritter  and  Rydqvist’s,  1994). 
An alternative explanation of the initial 
underpricing comes from the theories related to the 
bookbuilding  process  based  on  the  “market  feedback”  
hypothesis (Benveniste and Wilhelm, 1990), and the 
“agency   conflict   theory”   (Jensen   and   Meckling,  
1976). Following these theories, a company is willing 
to accept a low   offer   price   to   create   a   “demand  
effect”,   i.e.,   to   be   sure   that   the   demand   of   its   stocks  
will exceed the offering, thus being sure of the 
success of the IPO. Also, underwriters seem to assure 
the   company’s   management   that   the   stock   will   be  
followed by a highly rated analyst, emphasizing the 
positive effects that the coverage is likely to have on 
the future stock price. 
Many   studies   documented   analysts’   over  
optimism. Analysts may be overly optimistic because 
of potential conflicts of interest (Dugar and Nathan, 
1995), but also due to cognitive reasons. In this latter 
respect,   McNichols   and   O’Brien   (1997)   found   that  
analysts tend to initiate to cover a stock because they 
are optimistic about its future prospects. This 
evidence underlines a selection bias problem: only 
excessively optimistic analysts, on average, decide to 
cover companies. Analysts are not only over 
optimistic, but they also tend to be overconfident with 
respect to their skills (Nicholson, William, Fenton-
O’Creevy and Soane, 1998; Barber and Odean, 2000). 
The   idea  of  “fads”,   instead,  could  explain   long-
term underperfomance of IPOs (Aggarwal and Rivoli, 
1990). More in general, behavioral finance studies 
argue that while the initial underpricing represents an 
overreaction of the market, the long run 
underperformance is nothing but a correction of this 
former misvaluation. Furthermore, analysts can be 
distorted in their valuations by heuristics. A typical 
heuristic   that   affects   analyst’   behavior   is   called  
anchoring, i.e., the tendency to remain mentally 
anchored to a particular reference point (the mental 
“anchor”),  even  if  this  later  proves  to  be  irrelevant  for  
the decision that had to be taken. Investors, use this 
heuristic in deciding whether to invest or not in a 
stock. They tend to anchor either to the maximum 
price reached in the past by the stock, or the one at 
which they initially purchased it. Although it may 
seem unlikely for professionals like analysts, to be 
subject to anchoring, it affects their valuation since 
estimated target prices are often too close to current 
stock prices. 
With respect to market reaction, Womack (1996) 
calculated   that   the   market   reaction   to   analysts’  
recommendation changes in case of upgrade was 
2.4%, while for downgrades the abnormal return was 
definitely higher and equal to - 9.1%. This asymmetry 
is   due   to   analysts’   reluctance   in   conveying   negative  
news (Piras, Denti and Cervellati, 2012). However, 
since investors are aware about this fact, they react in 
a very negative way. Barber, Lehavy, McNichols and 
Trueman (2001)   studied   if   analysts’   consensus  
recommendation can be valuable for investors, i.e., if 
they could rely on their reports to implement 
profitable investment strategies. They confirmed that 
analysts’  recommendations  are  valuable  for  investors,  
but mainly in the very short run. Brav and Lehavy 
(2003), found that the market significantly reacts to 
changes in target prices. The reaction was positive for 
upgrades, but negative for downgrades. Bradley, 
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Bradford and Ritter (2003) showed that analysts 
started their coverage immediately after the IPO in 
76% of cases and with a positive judgement. In a five 
days window, the analyzed companies recorded an 
abnormal return of about 4.1%, against 0.1% for those 
which   were   not   covered   by   analysts’   reports.16 The 
fact that a recommendation came from one of the 
company’s   underwriter   or   not   seemed   not   to   affect  
these results. 
With regard to the Italian stock market, Fabrizio 
(2001)   examined   analysts’   reports   on   Italian   listed  
companies in the period 1998-1999, underlining that 
58.2% of the reports contained buy recommendations 
while only 6.1% were sell. Furthermore, brokers were 
generally more interested in bigger companies or in 
those with good growth perspectives. Bertoni, 
Giudici, Randone and Rorai (2002) analyzed all the 
report on companies listed on Borsa Italiana17 
between 1999 and 2001, and showed four interesting 
phenomena:   (i)   analysts’   valuations   were  
systematically over optimistic; (ii) recommendations 
tended to converge, regardless of the market cycle; 
(iii) valuations of analysts affiliated with the IPO 
underwriters were generally the most optimistic, 
raising doubt of potential conflicts of interests; (iv) 
limited reports circulation caused information 
asymmetry between institutional and individual 
investors, negatively affecting market efficiency.18  
 
3 Methodology and sample description 
 
In this paper, two distinct analysis have been 
performed. The first one is a content analysis that has 
been divided into three sections, distinguishing 
between the reports analyzing: the merger with World 
Online, the acquisition of Liberty Surf, and, finally, 
other smaller acquisitions. The second one is a 
traditional   “event   study”  with   two  main  purposes:   to  
verify, calculating Cumulative Abnormal Returns 
(CARs), the market reaction to the announcements of 
Tiscali’s   acquisitions,   and   to   understand   the  
relationship  between  investors’  behavior  and  analysts’  
recommendations.  
In little more than one year, Tiscali passed from 
being a small Italian telecom company to become the 
leader of the European internet sector. The company 
developed a complex business model merging the 
typical structure of telecom companies with the one 
used by modern Internet Service Providers (ISP). 
Such a company was not easy to evaluate, and 
analysts raised concerns with regard to the difficulties 
in calculating the value of internet companies.  
                                                          
16 The largest abnormal returns were found for those 
companies covered by more than one analyst. 
17 The reports are publicly and freely available on Borsa 
Italiana’s website. Borsa Italiana is the managing company of 
the Italian Stock Exchange. 
18 Also see Belcredi, Bozzi and Rigamonti (2003), Cervellati 
et al. (2007a, 2007b, 2008). 
Furthermore, Tiscali was a startup, and the valuation 
of a new ventures is definitely more difficult 
compared to calculating the value for already 
established companies, especially if in the high tech 
sector. In these cases, it is difficult to correctly 
identify how the company could develop its 
innovative ideas to create future market and growth 
opportunity, and eventually cash flows. As often 
happened for hi-tech companies,   Tiscali’s   financial  
results in the short term were negative, due to the high 
investments in IT and marketing. However – and this 
is an important aspect of the whole story – the 
company devoted a lot of funds to merger and 
acquisition (M&A) deals. In addition, like other 
internet firms, the company changed its business 
model and organization quite often in those years, 
complicating  even  further  analysts’  work.  Thus,   their  
struggle to evaluate Tiscali was justified. 
However, also psychological issues played a 
major role, as the paper will clarify, both in the 
company top management choices and in analysts 
valuations. 
To conduct the content analysis, all the reports 
issued between October 1999 and the first half of 
2001 have been considered. The detailed analysis of 
these reports underlined several contradictions and 
inaccuracies in the reports. Analysts were not always 
able   to   explain   the   real   consequences   of   Tiscali’s  
investment decisions and acquisition activity using 
traditional financial valuation methods. Often, 
analysts   preferred   to   use   “new   valuation   methods”  
applied at the time to discern the value of the so-
called   “New   Economy”   companies.   The   number   of  
subscribers and the growth potential, rather than cash 
flows, became the new basics for valuation. Of 
course, these variables were not necessarily linked to 
the value of the company, as the market assessed 
thereafter. Lastly, with regard to the event study, 
particular attention has been dedicated to verify the 
market reaction to recommendation changes and to 
Tiscali’s  investment  decisions  and  acquisitions. 
 
3.1 Analysis of the IPO process 
 
Tiscali’s   IPO   took   place   on   October,   27   1999   with  
ABN Amro Rothschild and Banca IMI as global 
coordinators of the combined offering. The offer price 
was   €46   per   share and the stock was admitted to 
listing on the Nuovo Mercato, the segment of the 
Italian Stock Exchange created in the same year and 
dedicated to the small and medium companies active 
in the technological sector. 
While   the   calculation   of   Tiscali’s   initial  
underpricing is straightforward since it is given by the 
difference between the closing price on the first 
trading day and the offer price, to analyze the long run 
underperfomance, a definition of the market return is 
needed to calculate abnormal returns. A possible 
choice would have been to take the Numtel, i.e., the 
index of the Nuovo Mercato. If on one hand that 
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would have been an appropriate choice since this 
latter index represent companies in high-tech sector – 
thus more close to Tiscali – on the other hand the 
large market capitalization of the company during the 
internet bubble created a situation in which it made up 
a great part of the Numtel. Thus, this index has been 
discarded, while the more general Mibtel (Milano 
Indice Borsa Telematica) has been chosen since it 
represents the whole Italian Stock Exchange. 
 
3.2  Content  analysis  of  analysts’  reports 
 
All the reports issued between the IPO date and the 
first half of 2001 have been analyzed. The reason to 
stop analyzing reports in this period is that the last 
important acquisition made by Tiscali to achieve the 
leadership in the European internet sector – the target 
company was Line One – was announced on April, 25 
2001. More attention has been devoted to the most 
relevant reports, i.e., those dealing with the valuation 
of M&A deals. 
It is interesting to analyze these reports since it is 
possible to underline the distinct valuation techniques 
used by analysts. Table 1 summarizes the main 
acquisitions made by the company in the considered 
period (Most of the reports in the sample focus on two 
deals: the merger with World Online and the 
acquisition of Liberty Surf. The other deals did not 
receive the same attention by analysis by analysts). 
 
Table 1. Main European acquisitions made by Tiscali by date of deal announcement 
 
Date  Company 
 
Sector/Type  
 
Nationality 
23/12/99 Nets SA; A Telecom SA Telecom French  
14/01/00 Datacomm AG  ISP Swiss  
24/01/00 cd-Telekomunikace Telecom Czech  
03/02/00 Ideare Srl  Internet Italian  
10/02/00 Link line ISP Belgian  
25/02/00 Nikoma Beteiligungs Gmbh Telecom German  
13/03/00 Interweb Sprl ISP Belgian  
12/05/00 Quinary IT Italian  
07/09/00 World Online ISP Anglo-Belgian  
20/12/00 Addcom ISP German  
08/01/01 Liberty Surf ISP French  
12/02/01 Excite Italia ISP Italian  
12/04/01 Planet Interkom  ISP German  
24/04/01 SurfEU ISP  German  
25/04/01 Line One ( Springboard Internet Service Ltd) ISP British  
 
Before applying the content analysis on the 
reports, a classification of the recommendation is 
needed to investigate the effects of the information 
issued by analysts. Recommendations have thus been 
divided into five distinct categories: Buy, 
Outperform/Add, Neutral/Hold/Market Perform, 
Underperform/Reduce, Sell (In practice, some of 
these terms are used to mean the same 
recommendation.   In   this   respect,   “outperform”   or  
“add”   have   similar   meaning,   as   well   as   “neutral”,  
“hold”   and   “market   perform”   may   be   considered   as  
interchangeable,   like   “underperform”   or   “reduce”.  
This is why in Table 2, only one term is used for each 
kind of recommendation). Table 2 presents such 
classification  per  year  of  reports’  issuance.  
 
Table 2. Number of reports on Tiscali by type of recommendation and year of (1999-2001) 
 
 Recommendation 
Year Buy Add Neutral Reduce Sell 
1999 2 - - - - 
2000 6 2 11 2 3 
2001 4 1 28 17 5 
Total 12 3 39 19 8 
 
While in 2000 there were six buy and eleven 
neutral recommendation, in 2001 there were only four 
buys while the number of neutral recommendations 
grown to 28, with a strong increase in negative ratings 
like reduce or sell. This is a clear indication of how 
analysts change their mind with regard to Tiscali after 
Corporate Ownership & Control / Volume 10, Issue 1, 2012, Continued - 3 
 
 384 
the burst of the bubble (The peak of the bubble can be 
identified around March 2000). 
Aggregating the reports by quarter, based on 
their issuance date, it is possible to show the trend 
followed by recommendations, as depicted in Figure 
1. It is straightforward to see a downward sloping 
trend   in   analysts’   rating   from   2000   to   2001.
 
Figure 1. Analysts’  reports  by  quarter  and  type  of  recommendation  (2000-2001) 
 
 
 
3.3 Event study 
 
While   the   content   analysis   showed   Tiscali’s   main  
acquisitions  through  the  study  of  analysts’  reports,  the  
event study that follows measure the market reactions 
to their announcements. Average abnormal returns 
(ARs) are calculated taking as index the Mibtel, for 
the reasons that were mentioned above. A window of 
ten days surrounding the event date is considered: [-5; 
+5]. The returns of both the stock and the index, at 
time t, have been calculated as natural logarithm of 
the ratio between the price at time t and the price at t-
1: Ri,t = ln (pi,t / pi,t-1) (Stock and the index prices have 
been obtained from Datastream). To measure ARs, 
the   “market   adjusted   model”   has   been   chosen.   To  
catch the market reaction to the issuance of positive or 
negative recommendations, two distinct models have 
been considered: 
 
tPOSmt RR HOJED uu  
tNEGmt RR HOJED uu  
 
The only difference between them is that in the 
first model the dummy POSO  catches the effects of 
the publication of positive ratings on the stock returns, 
while in the second one the dummy NEGO  explains the 
effects of negative recommendations. This means that 
if  the  analyst’s  recommendation  is  positive,   POSO  will 
be equal to 1 and NEGO  to 0, vice versa if the 
recommendation is negative. The purpose is to verify 
the   null   hypothesis   of   “absence   of   the   effect   of   the  
recommendation”   through   a   simple   T-test for the 
parameter J. 
 
4 Empirical results 
 
4.1 IPO 
The  closing  price  of  the  Tiscali’  stock  in  the  first  
trading   day   was   €   71.3,   an   underpricing   of   55%  
compared   to   the   offer   price   of      €   46   (see   Figure   2).
 
Figure 2. Tiscali’s  initial  underpricing 
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Tiscali was not an isolated case. During the 
dotcom bubble, other IPOs in the Italian Stock 
Exchange recorded high level of underpricing. 
Finmatica (Finmatica was an Italian a software 
provider for the banking sector. In 2004, it declared 
bankruptcy) was the most impressive example, with 
an initial underpricing of +686.8%. The period 1998-
2001 showed the highest concentration of IPOs since 
the   ’80s,  with  85  IPOs  from  1995  to  1997,  definitely  
an  “hot  issue  market”.   
In terms of long run underperformance, the 
CARs and BHRs have been calculated considering a 5 
year window, from October, 27 1999 to the same day 
in 2004, as shown in Figure 3. 
 
Figure 3. CARs and BHRs for Tiscali’s  stock  in  the  five  years  after  the  IPO 
 
 
 
The BHRs line is steeper than the CAR at the 
peak of the bubble, since the way BHRs are 
calculated amplifies extreme returns. In this respect, 
the 1,100% BHRs peak shown in Figure 3 dates back 
to   March,   10   2000,   when   Tiscali’s   stock   price   was  
about  €  1,200.   
 
4.2 Content analysis of the research 
reports 
 
With   regard   to   analysts’   valuations   on   Tiscali,   it  
should be underlined their poor knowledge of the 
internet sector and the consequent difficulties in 
predicting its future evolution. According to 
behavioral finance, even professionals like analysts 
are subject to cognitive errors and use heuristics to 
take decisions, especially when they face a great deal 
of uncertainty. To show how analysts tried to cope 
with this uncertainty, an analysis of their reports 
covering  Tiscali’s  acquisitions  follows. 
To become the leader in the European internet 
sector, the top management implemented a series of 
acquisitions, generally financed through new shares 
issues. Tiscali acquired the biggest internet companies 
in Europe, like World Online which, with its network 
in optic fibre represented its most ambitious deal. The 
leadership in the European internet sector was 
achieved on April 25th, 2001 with the purchase of 
Line One, a leading British ISP and fourth web portal 
in United Kingdom, co-owned by British Telecom 
and United Business Media. Thanks to this 
acquisition, Tiscali overcame its strongest competitor, 
the German T-Online, thus becoming the first ISP in 
Europe. 
 
4.2.1 The merger with World Online 
 
World  Online  (“WOL”  from  now  on),  was  an  Anglo-
Belgian company with 2.3 million active users. 
Tiscali acquired WOL, paying in stocks: 0,4891 own 
shares for each WOL share. The deal adviser, UBS, 
valuated  the  deal  €5.9bn. 
The target prices and recommendations 
contained in the reports analyzing the deal and 
estimating the combined company value are shown in 
Table 3. 
 
Table 3. Research reports valuating the merger with World online 
 
Broker Date Target  price  (€) Recommendation 
Banca Leonardo 06/09/00 55 Market Outperform 
Credit Suisse 07/09/00 - Hold 
Credit Suisse 15/09/00 - Hold 
Chase 08/09/00 60 Buy 
Intermonte Sec. 11/09/00 43 Neutral 
Centrosim 25/10/00 36 - 38 Market Perform 
Banca IMI 28/11/00 42.6 - 51 Buy 
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The valuation methods used in these studies are 
based on multiples. While sometimes they used 
traditional multiples like EV/Sales, they also use 
some  “innovative”  ratios  using  different categories of 
subscribers like EV/Subscribers, EV/Active 
subscribers, EV/Unique subscribers, EV/Latest 
subscribers, or even EV/Page view, assuming that the 
number of pages viewed could be a proxy for value. 
The EV/Subscribers ratio has been often used to 
determine the value of internet companies. 
Analysts seemed to think that this multiple could 
solve   the   issues   related   to   internet   companies’  
valuation, given the impossibility of using traditional 
multipliers due to their lack of profitability. 
However, these multiples proved to be unable 
neither   to   provide   a   measure   of   the   subscribers’  
fidelity nor to produce real value for the companies. 
Table 4 compares these two types of multiple.  
 
Table 4. Revenue and user multiples between 2000 and 2002, by broker 
 
Broker EV/Sales x EV/Subscribers x 2000E 2001E 2002E Current 2001E 2002E 
Centrosim 27.0 7.0 - - - - 
Banca IMI 20.7 6.9 5.0 1,219 - - 
Banca Leonardo 35.4 19.6 11.4 1,965 1,339 1,088 
Chase - - - - - - 
Credit Suisse - - - - - - 
Credit Suisse 26.0 12.0 - 3,016 - - 
Intermonte Sec. 28.3 13.1 8.4 2,561 1,646 1,234 
 
The most relevant ones refer to the subscriber 
multiple, which ranges from 1,219x for Banca IMI to 
3,016x for Credit Suisse in 2000. This large range can 
be explained with the poor reliability of the data about 
subscribers,   but   also   with   analysts’   little   expertise  
using these new multiples. 
Instead, with regard to the EV/Sales multiplier, 
the degree of variability in estimates for 2000 was 
definitely lower, probably underlining the greatest 
confidence analysts had with traditional ratios. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.2.2 The acquisition of Liberty Surf 
 
Just after having completed the deal with World 
Online, Tiscali announced the purchase of the 72.94% 
of voting rights of Liberty Surf, the second French 
ISP behind Wanadoo. Liberty Surf stock was 
estimated  €  9.83,  for  a  total  amount  of  €  900  billion.  
With this acquisition, Tiscali got close to become the 
leading European web portal, with ten million 
registered users and 4.9 million active users, 
immediately after the German T-Online (owned by 
Deutsche Telekom). 
Table 5 shows target prices and 
recommendations contained in the reports analyzing 
the deal.  
 
Table 5. Research reports valuating the acquisition of Liberty Surf 
 
Broker Date Target  price  (€) Recommendation 
Albertini 09/01/01 - Reduce 
Credit Suisse 09/01/01 - Hold 
Euromobiliare* 09/01/01 12 Reduce 16/02/01 12 Sell 
Cheuvreux 11/01/01 21 Outperform 
Intermonte Sec.* 11/01/01 15 Underperform 
Banca IMI* 23/01/01 41 Buy 
Banca Leonardo* 26/01/01 19,1 Hold 
Merrill Lynch 16/02/01 - Neutral 
 
* Reports where Tiscali has been valuated with the Discounted Cash Flows (DCF) method19  
 
 
                                                          
19 In January and February 2001, Tiscali’s share price (adjusted after stock splits and new rights issues) ranged between €12 
and €20.3. It is possible to notice that all target prices issued in this period were aligned to the actual Tiscali share price, with 
the exception of the one calculated by Banca IMI. 
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It is interesting to note that, while only few 
months had passed since the WOL deal, most analysts 
revised their valuation techniques, rehabilitating the 
DCF method, previously considered unable to grasp 
the  internet  companies’  growth  opportunities.   
Half of the reports examining the acquisition of 
Liberty Surf adopted the DCF methodology together 
with relative valuation methods (multiples). However, 
in   that   period   it   was   quite   evident   analysts’  
uncertainty about the future of the internet sector. 
This uncertainty affected both their relative valuation 
- through the unclear projections analysts developed 
on revenues, EBITDA and earnings - and DCF 
estimates that seemed to depend on discretional 
assumptions. As for DCF, Table 6 describes the main 
differences between  analysts’  models. 
 
Table 6. Details of the DCF models (beta, WACC and growth rate) by broker 
 
Broker Beta WACC (%) Growth, g (%) 
Banca IMI 1.97 10 5 
Banca Leonardo 1.7 - 1.8 11.7 - 12.1 4.0 - 4.5 
Euromobiliare 2.0 10 5 
Intermonte Sec. - 10.6 5.5 
 
With regard to multipliers, Table 7 shows large 
ranges in values: 6,3 < (EV/Sales)2000 < 15,5; 438 < 
(EV/Current Active Subs)2000 <1.263; 438 < 
(EV/Subs)2000 < 1.263. This variability was due to 
poor estimates of revenues and subscribers that 
analysts were able to develop from the limited 
information available, and that produced very 
heterogeneous valuations. 
 
Table 7. Revenue and subscriber multiples between 2000 and 2002 
 
Broker EV/Sales (x) EV/Subs  (€) 2000E 2001E 2002E Current 2001E 2002E 
Albertini - - - 722 - - 
Banca IMI 14.6 6.0 4.6 1,243 - - 
Banca Leonardo 15.5 7.6 5.4 1,263 791 582 
Cheuvreux - 5.0 3.6 - - 660 
Credit Suisse - 3.0 - 438 - - 
Euromobiliare 6.3 3.2 - 617 - - 
Euromobiliare 12.6 6.7 - 1,054 - - 
Intermonte Sec. 8.5 4.1 - 862 - - 
Merrill Lynch 8.8 5.4 3.9 834 561 405 
 
3.3.3 Other minor acquisitions 
 
In the first quarter of 2000, despite the recent IPO and 
the starting of its campaign of acquisitions in Europe, 
the reports on Tiscali were just two: Banca Leonardo, 
on January, 1, and Banca IMI, on March, 17. 
Banca Leonardo issued its report after the 
acquisition of the two French telecom companies, 
Nets SA and A Telecom SA, announced on 
December, 23 1999. 
The report by Banca IMI, instead, was released 
after six deals which, in addition to the above-
mentioned companies, involved: the Swiss ISP 
DataComm AG, the Czech telecom company cd-
Telekomunikace, the German ISP, the telecom firm 
Nikoma, the Belgian Link Line and the portal 
Interweb. 
Analysts of both banks adopted a Sum of the 
Parts   (“SOTP”)   approach,   which   Banca   Leonardo  
added to its DCF model and its multiples. The parts 
into which the analysts distinguished the company 
were almost the same: Voice, Internet, International 
Acquisitions and UMTS. 
With regard to the second quarter of 2000, the 
most complete reports of were issued by: Chase (May, 
17), Credit Suisse (June, 12), Intermonte Securities 
(May, 2 and 16) and UBS (June, 8). 
Instead of focusing on specific deals, these 
reports provided a valuation of Tiscali after the series 
of acquisitions the company announced in the 
previous quarter. 
Also in these reports, multiples were the most 
used valuation method. However, Intermonte, Chase 
and UBS adopted DCF as well. 
The third quarter of 2000 was characterized by a 
larger number of reports, even if part of them were 
focusing on the merger with WOL. The remaining 
reports were issued by Cheuvreux (July, 10) and 
Credit Suisse (August, 31) before the WOL deal. 
While Credit Suisse adopted a peer comparison 
approach, Cheuvreux proposed a DCF model in 
addition to it. 
The reports referring to the fourth quarter of 
2000 are instead four and were issued by Credit 
Suisse (November, 15), Euromobiliare (November, 
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16) and Intermonte Securities (November, 16 and 
December, 5).  
The report by Credit Suisse is just an update of 
the  analyst’s  valuation  after  the  announcements  of  the  
quarterly results. Thus, it does not contain any model 
of valuation. 
Both analysts of Euromobiliare and Intermonte, 
instead, adopted relative valuation methods 
(multipliers) and only Intermonte also used the DCF 
method. 
The reports issued in this period showed a 
different point of view in comparison with those of 
the first months of the year, still characterized by 
excessively optimistic estimates. This trend inversion, 
however, was not shared by all analysts. 
An example is provided by Banca IMI who, in 
the report dated November, 28 (see Table 5), in 
contrast to the majority of the neutral and 
underperform recommendations, issued a buy.  
In the first quarter of 2001, analysts were 
focusing on the acquisition of Liberty Surf, 
announced on January, 8. Among the reports that did 
not focus on the deal, the following have been 
analyzed: Intermonte (February, 16and March, 29), 
Julius Bar (February, 15 and March, 21), Merrill 
Lynch (February, 13 and 15, and March, 29) and 
Nomura (February, 28). 
The majority of these studies are brief updates, 
where analysts revised their estimates after the 
announcement of the results of the fourth quarter. The 
valuation of the company in these reports was, on 
average, negative. This was due to the fact that the Q4 
results were below expectations and that the new 
acquisitions Tiscali had announced in Germany and 
UK were not considered useful to increase neither the 
number of users nor the value of the company. Most 
analysts still relied on the multiples, with the 
exception of those of Julius Bar and Nomura, who 
used, in addition, DCF.  
The second quarter of 2001 was rich of studies, 
most of which concentrated in May, after the three 
acquisitions announced in April: Planet Interkom 
(April, 12), SurfEU (April, 24) and LineOne (April, 
25). 
Table 8 shows the variability characterizing both 
target prices and recommendations contained in these 
studies,  varying  from  €9  to  €22  and  from  Sell  to  Buy,  
respectively. While the reports issued by Julius Bar 
and Merrill Lynch are just updates, with no valuation, 
in the others, the company has been evaluated using 
multiples (EV/Sales, EV/Subs) and the DCF. 
The   content   analysis   of   analysts’   reports   has  
shown that, on average, during the internet craze there 
was great uncertainty about the right method to use in 
order to value internet companies. The DCF and the 
other traditional methods were deemed unsuitable to 
value this new sector with its peculiar characteristics 
(i.e., high capital expenditures, negative initial cash 
flows, high growth rates etc). 
Thus, analysts preferred to use multiples based 
on either revenues or the number of subscribers, 
proving that they were not able to handle them to 
value internet companies. 
Even if they are easy to use, multipliers are 
approximations to value of a company. In the 
behavioral finance terminology, they can be 
considered as valuation heuristics (Shefrin, 2006). 
The  most  common  problems   in  analysts’  use  of  
multiples are mentioned below.  
First,  analysts  had  problems   in   finding  Tiscali’s  
comparable companies since they had to be active in 
the same sector, but also have similar business 
models, financial structure and growth rates. 
However, analyzing the reports it is clear that the 
peers they chose were different from report to report 
and in some cases they included companies listed in a 
US stock exchange. 
Second, analysts disagreed on the identification 
of most appropriate multiple to use in valuing internet 
companies. For example, with regard to revenue 
multiples, while some analysts considered just the 
proceeds from advertising and e-commerce, others 
used   the   company’s   total   revenues,   thus   including  
access, connectivity and web hosting proceeds. As a 
consequence, these different choices led to different 
Enterprise Values. Also for multipliers using the 
number of subscribers, there were similar issues. In 
particular, analysts have difficulty in learn the exact 
number  of  the  company’s  subscribers. 
Third, the some multiples were too variable and 
incapable   of   measuring   the   company’s   value.   This  
was   particularly   true   for   the   subscribers’   multiple, 
adopted by analysts in several versions. For example, 
analysts used current or future visitors, occasional or 
regular ones, unique visitors and subscribers, ending 
up with the number of pages viewed. 
At the end of 2000, analysts returned using the 
DCF, but both growth and discount rates were 
different from report to report. Most of the reports 
analyzed were characterized by similar mistakes. A 
detailed analysis of them has highlighted the presence 
of systematic errors followed by analysts. 
The most common behavioral bias among 
analysts   and   investors   seemed   to   be   the   “optimism  
bias”.   It   is   visible   both   in   the   general   euphoria   that  
pushed  investors  to  frantically  buy  the  Tiscali’s  stock  
and   in   the   over   optimistic   analysts’   valuations.  
Another analysts’   common   used   heuristic   was  
“anchoring”.   Anchoring   occurs   when   individuals,   in  
taking decisions, tend to anchor their opinions to 
determined values and do not adjust sufficiently. 
Often, analysts issued valuations in order to obtain 
target prices as close as possible to the current ones. 
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Table 8. Reports issued after minor deals between 2000 and the first half of 2001, by quarter 
 
Date Broker Target  price  (€) Recommendation 
Q1 2000 
10/01/00 Banca Leonardo * 506 Outperform 
17/03/00 Banca IMI 1,458 - 1,682 Buy 
Q2 2000 
02/05/00 Intermonte Sec. * 75 Buy 16/05/00 80 Buy 
17/05/00 Chase * 80 Buy 
08/06/00 UBS * 44 Hold 
12/06/00 Credit Suisse - Hold 
Q3 2000 
10/07/00 Cheuvreux * 38 Underperform 
31/08/00 Credit Suisse - Hold 
Q4 2000 
15/11/00 Credit Suisse - Hold 
16/11/00 Euromobiliare 24 Sell 
16/11/00 Intermonte Sec. * 32 Neutral 05/12/00 20.5 Underperform 
Q1 2001 
16/02/01 Intermonte Sec. 12.3 Sell 29/03/01 12.3 Sell 
15/02/01 Julius Bar * 13 Reduce 21/03/01 13 Reduce 
13/02/01 
Merrill Lynch 
- Neutral 
15/02/01 - Neutral 
29/03/01 - Neutral 
28/02/01 Nomura * 14 Sell 
Q2 2001    
12/04/01 Julius Bar 13 Reduce 
17/04/01 Banca IMI * - Buy 17/05/01 22 Buy 
17/04/01 Merrill Lynch - Neutral 21/05/01 - Neutral 
04/05/01 Credit Suisse * 9 Hold 18/05/01 9 Hold 
15/05/01 BNP Paribas * 15.3 Neutral 12/06/01 15.3 Neutral 
17/05/01 Euromobiliare * 12 Sell 
 
* Reports in which Tiscali has been valuated with the DCF method. 
 
Tables 9 and 10 show the above-mentioned 
phenomenon, by reporting current and target prices 
contained  in  the  analysts’  reports. 
The median difference between target prices and 
current prices shows the presence of anchoring on the 
whole observation period (24.4% in 2000, 16.7% in 
2001). The widest differences refer, on average, to the 
reports issued in 2000, but relevant values have been 
found also for 2001: 103.5% for BNP Paribas and 
99.7% (later on 51.4%) for Banca IMI. This last value 
underlines another important issue: the existence of 
conflicts of interest. 
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Table 9. Target prices vs current prices (2000) 
 
Quarter Broker Target  Price,  TP  (€) Current  Price,  CP  (€) (TP – CP)/CP (%) 
Q1 Banca IMI 1,458 - 1,682 1,058 37.8% - 59.0% 
Banca Leonardo 506 416 21.6% 
Q2 Chase 80 57.95 37.9% 
Credit Suisse - 52 - 
Intermonte 75 59 27.1% 
  80 58 38.1% 
UBS 44 51 13.7% 
Q3 Banca Leonardo 54 48 13.3% 
  55 46 19.6% 
Chase 60 46 30.6% 
Cheuvreux 38 47 18.6% 
Credit Suisse - 44 - 
  - 46 - 
  - 44 - 
Eptasim - 47 - 
  - - - 
Intermonte 46 50 8.0% 
  43 47 7.5% 
Q4 Centrosim 36 - 38 40 8.9% - 3.8% 
Credit Suisse - 34 - 
Euromobiliare 24 35.46 32.3% 
Banca IMI 42.6 - 51 34 27.2% - 52.2% 
Intermonte 32 36 9.9% 
  20.5 30 30.5% 
   Average 24.9% 
   Median 24.4% 
 
Both  Banca  IMI  and  ABN  Amro  were  Tiscali’s  
advisors in the IPO process. Banca IMI always issued 
positive recommendations on the company, and it 
reiterated its buy recommendation in 2001, when the 
speculative bubble had burst and most analysts 
eventually realized the mistakes made in their 
previous valuation. However, also an ABN Amro 
report dating back to the early part of 2000 seems to 
suggest potential conflicts of interest (The report has 
not been analyzed since it could not be found. Only 
the target price has been recovered from the financial 
press.). In February 2000, when Tiscali stock price 
was  around  €  500,  the  Dutch  broker  issued  a  one-year 
target  price  of  €1,000  and  a  long  term  one  of  €1,500,  
potentially  causing  an  increase  in  Tiscali’s  share  price  
of 36% in just one day.  
A further behavioral bias that can be found 
analyzing   the   reports   is   the   so   called   “hot   hand  
fallacy”,   i.e.,   an   unjustified   extrapolation of past 
trends in formulating estimates. Thus, in bull markets 
analysts usually expect high returns, while in bear 
ones they expect low performances. A positive 
relationship between the bullish or bearish markets 
and   the   analysts’   recommendations   on   the   Tiscali’s  
stock seems first to reflect their initial euphoria, then 
the burst of the bubble. 
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Table 10. Target prices vs current prices (2001) 
 
Quarter Broker Target  Price,  TP  (€) Current  Price,  CP  (€) (TP – CP)/CP (%) 
Q1 Albertini - 14.3 - 
Banca Leonardo 19.0 21.0 9.5% 
Cheuvreux 21.0 16.4 28.0% 
Credit Suisse - 13.7 - 
Euromobiliare 12.0 13.4 10.4% 
 12.0 18.4 34.8% 
Banca IMI 41.0 20.5 99.7% 
Intermonte 15.0 16.2 7.4% 
  12.3 16.2 24.1% 
  12.3 15.2 19.1% 
Julius Bar 13.0 18.3 29.0% 
  13.0 15.8 17.7% 
Merrill Lynch - 13.7 - 
  - 19.3 - 
  - 18.9 - 
  - 17.8 - 
 - 15.2 - 
Nomura 14.0 15.3 8.7% 
Q2 BNP Paribas 15.3 14.6 4.6% 
  15.3 13.2 15.9% 
Credit Suisse 9.0 15.7 42.7% 
  9.0 14.7 38.8% 
Euromobiliare 12.0 14.9 19.5% 
Banca IMI - 14.8 - 
  22.0 14.5 51.4% 
Julius Bar 13.0 15.0 13.3% 
Merrill Lynch - 15.0 - 
  - 14.3 - 
Q3 BNP Paribas - 8.0 - 
  - 7.0 - 
  - 7.4 - 
  - - - 
  15.3 7.5 103.5% 
  - 7.7 - 
 - 5.0 - 
Caboto - 7.3 - 
Cheuvreux 6.0 7.2 16.7% 
Euromobiliare 6.6 7.3 9.6% 
Banca IMI 7.3 7.3 0.7% 
Intermonte 6.5 7.3 11.0% 
Merrill Lynch - 10.0 - 
  7.6 9.0 15.1% 
  - 7.6 - 
  7.6 9.0 15.1% 
  7.6 7.2 5.6% 
Schroder 7.0 6.9 1.6% 
WestLB Panmure 5.5 6.8 19.1% 
Q4 BNP Paribas - 7.7 - 
Cheuvreux - 8.2 - 
Credit Suisse 6.0 8.7 31.0% 
Fortis 13.5 10.3 30.7% 
Banca IMI 9.5 8.7 9.2% 
Julius Bar - 8.7 - 
Rasfin 7.8 11.3 31.0% 
Santander 6.8 8.0 15.5% 
   Average 23.9% 
   Median 16.7% 
 
Corporate Ownership & Control / Volume 10, Issue 1, 2012, Continued - 3 
 
 392 
4.3 Event study 
 
The parameters estimation, obtained through the 
ordinary least squared (OLS) regression, shows that 
analysts’   recommendations,   whether   positive   or  
negative, seem statistically meaningless. 
Recommendations cannot help properly explaining 
the observed abnormal returns, probably due to 
different factors, other than the publication of 
analysts’   reports.   Only   the   coefficient   associated   to  
the market index return, Rm, is statistically significant, 
as shown in Table 11. 
 
Table 11. Regression Analysis 
 
Coefficient Positive Model  (551 observations) 
Negative Model  
(551 observations) 
Const 0.00142328 (0.6627) 0.00174316 (0.8051) 
R_m 1.89688*** (12.56) 1.89095*** (12.51) 
D_Pos 0.000358063 (0.02561) - 
D_Neg - -0.00779918 (-0.7188) 
Adj. R2 0.22084 0.22157 
F(2, 548) 78.9435 (p-value = 0.0000) 79.2758 (p-value = 0.0000) 
 
The first column in Table 11 contains the 
estimated coefficients: the constant, D, the coefficient 
of the market return variable, E, the coefficients of the 
D_Pos / D_Neg dummy, J, depending on the model. 
For both models, the following values have been 
reported: the adjusted R-squared, measuring the grade 
of the linear relationship between the dependent 
variable and the independent ones, and the value of 
the F statistics with (2, 548) degrees of freedom. In 
parenthesis, the values of the T-statistics are presented 
(Three stars measure the statistical significance of the 
coefficient for an interval of confidence of 99%). 
The effect that recommendation changes had on 
the stock returns have been analyzed using CARs, 
considering a three day window around the issuance 
date containing the recommendations changes (Table 
12). In panel A, the raw returns (ABS), the ARs and 
the CARs on the 3 days windows surrounding the 
report’   issuance   date   are   presented   for   year   2000.  
Panel B presents the same figures for year 2001.  
Looking at Table 12, it is possible to notice that 
recommendation changes (in bold) are just ten, 
because most analysts decided to watch the evolution 
of Tiscali remaining Neutral. The ones who changed 
their recommendations are Intermonte (from buy on 
May, 16 2000 to neutral on August, 10 2000, then to 
underperform on December, 5 2000 ending up to sell 
on February, 16 2001, before going back to 
underperform on August, 31 2001), Banca Leonardo 
(from outperform on September, 7 2000 to hold on 
January, 26 2001), Merrill Lynch (from neutral on 
July, 5 2001 to reduce on August, 6 2001), and Banca 
IMI (from buy on May, 17 2001 to hold on August, 
30 2001).  
 
Table 12 Panel A. ABSs, ARs and CARs 
 
Date Broker Recommendation R_Tis (%) ABS (%) AR % CAR % 
10/01/2000 Banca Leonardo Outperform +0.04 0.04 +1.05 +15.67 
17/03/2000 Banca IMI Buy +1.67 1.67 +0.20 -15.95 
02/05/2000 Intermonte Buy +9.77 9.77 +6.57 +19.72 
16/05/2000 Intermonte Buy +2.98 2.98 +1.27 -1.45 
17/05/2000 Chase Buy -2.98 2.98 -0.65 +0.04 
08/06/2000 UBS Hold +4.76 4.76 +5.15 -1.73 
12/06/2000 Credit Suisse Hold -4.02 4.02 -3.55 -8.99 
10/07/2000 Cheuvreux Underperform +1.06 1.06 +1.10 +4.65 
10/08/2000 Intermonte Neutral -3.67 3.67 -4.10 -7.89 
18/08/2000 Eptasim Sell +0.96 0.96 +1.47 -1.67 
31/08/2000 Credit Suisse  Hold +4.67 4.67 +3.53 +3.29 
04/09/2000 Banca Leonardo Market Perform -1.27 1.27 -1.97 -0.74 
07/09/2000 Banca Leonardo Outperform 0.00 0.00 -0.53 +2.62 Credit Suisse Hold 
08/09/2000 Chase Buy +2.26 2.26 +3.46 -0.44 
11/09/2000 Intermonte Neutral -3.24 3.24 -3.36 -1.91 
15/09/2000 Credit Suisse Hold -2.02 2.02 -0.95 -0.20 
25/10/2000 Centrosim Market Perform -5.28 5.28 -5.08 +5.28 
15/11/2000 Credit Suisse Hold +1.42 1.42 +0.64 +4.23 
16/11/2000 Euromobiliare Sell -2.14 2.14 -1.47 -3.03 Intermonte Neutral 
28/11/2000 Banca IMI Buy -3.14 3.14 -2.43 -7.64 
05/12/2000 Intermonte Underperform -1.40 1.40 -2.98 -15.28 
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Table 12 Panel B. ABSs, ARs and CARs 
 
Date Broker Recommendation R_Tis (%) ABS (%) AR % CAR % 
09/01/2001 
Albertini  Reduce 
+5.20 5.20 +5.14 +16.46 Credit Suisse Hold Euromobiliare Reduce 
Merrill Lynch Neutral 
11/01/2001 Cheuvreux Outperform +7.02 7.02 +5.69 +19.77 Intermonte Underperform 
23/01/2001 Banca IMI Buy +5.79 5.79 -5.27 +4.99 
26/01/2001 Banca Leonardo Hold -1.89 1.89 -1.77 -2.54 
13/02/2001 Merrill Lynch  Neutral +0.36 0.36 +0.95 -0.51 
15/02/2001 
Credit Suisse Hold 
-3.54 3.54 -4.05 -19.04 Julius Bar Reduce 
Merrill Lynch Neutral 
16/02/2001 
Euromobiliare Sell 
-13.23 13.23 -11.47 -18.38 Intermonte Sell 
Merrill Lynch Neutral 
28/02/2001 Nomura Sell -3.03 3.03 -3.03 -7.75 
21/03/2001 Julius Bar Reduce -5.45 5.45 -4.41 -2.26 
29/03/2001 Intermonte Sell 0.00 0.00 -1.53 -2.55 Merrill Lynch Neutral 
12/04/2001 Julius Bar Reduce -0.13 0.13 -0.59 -3.02 
17/04/2001 Banca IMI Buy -1.95 1.95 -2.23 -0.05 Merrill Lynch Neutral 
04/05/2001 Credit Suisse Hold -0.73 0.73 -1.02 -1.93 
15/05/2001 BNP Paribas Neutral +1.22 1.22 +1.79 -0.45 
17/05/2001 Euromobiliare Sell -0.34 0.34 -0.28 -3.51 Banca IMI Buy 
18/05/2001 Credit Suisse Hold -2.55 2.55 -2.87 -1.22 
21/05/2001 Merrill Lynch Neutral +1.11 1.11 +1.93 +1.20 
12/06/2001 BNP Paribas Neutral -4.57 4.57 -3.44 -7.11 
05/07/2001 Merrill Lynch Neutral -4.37 4.37 -4.36 -4.65 
12/07/2001 BNP Paribas Neutral +3.68 3.68 +3.69 -1.61 
31/07/2001 BNP Paribas Neutral +4.87 4.87 +4.64 +16.65 Schroder Neutral 
02/08/2001 BNP Paribas Neutral +9.12 9.12 +9.54 +19.63 
06/08/2001 Merrill Lynch Reduce -1.69 1.69 -2.54 -5.63 
16/08/2001 Merrill Lynch Reduce -5.44 5.44 -4.51 -9.04 
21/08/2001 BNP Paribas Neutral +9.03 9.03 +8.94 +7.00 
23/08/2001 BNP Paribas Neutral -3.24 3.24 -3.44 -5.40 
30/08/2001 BNP Paribas Neutral -6.06 6.06 -4.17 +0.14 Banca IMI Hold 
31/08/2001 
Caboto Hold 
0.00 0.00 +0.49 -5.35 Euromobiliare Reduce Intermonte Underperform 
Merrill Lynch Reduce 
03/09/2001 Cheuvreux Underperform -2.67 2.67 -1.67 +0.16 
06/09/2001 WestLB Panmure Underperform -7.50 7.50 -4.92 -7.78 
24/09/2001 BNP Paribas Neutral +6.16 6.16 -0.67 -1.45 
18/10/2001 BNP Paribas Neutral -1.18 1.18 -0.54 -0.04 
29/10/2001 Santander Underperform +2.72 2.72 +4.22 +0.98 
12/11/2001 Cheuvreux Underperform -3.25 3.25 -0.72 -0.23 
14/11/2001 Julius Bar Reduce +4.41 4.41 +4.14 +8.80 
15/11/2001 Credit Suisse Hold +2.40 2.40 +1.64 +5.53 Banca IMI Hold 
10/12/2001 Rasfin Reduce -0.64 0.64 +1.15 -0.01 
20/12/2001 Fortis Buy -4.25 4.25 -3.11 -3.69 
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5 Conclusion  
 
The main objective of the paper is to identify how 
behavioral biases affected analysts, distorting their 
valuation of internet companies during the dot.com 
bubble, through a clinical study of Tiscali, the most 
emblematic Italian internet company at the time. 
Three analysis have been carried off: the first 
regarding the three regularities characterizing the IPO 
process (hot issue markets, initial underpricing, long-
run underperformance), the second performing a 
content analysis of the reports covering the main 
acquisitions of telecom and IPS companies, and, 
finally, the third one consisting in an event study 
measuring the market reaction to recommendation 
changes and to the deals announcements. 
The first analysis has underlined the presence of 
all three phenomena. Tiscali went public in the hottest 
market for internet companies in the entire history of 
financial markets, it recorded an initial underpricing 
of 55% and the long-run performance was definitely 
poor. 
The content analysis, instead, showed a 
generalized excessive optimism among analysts, both 
due to potential conflicts of interest and behavioral 
biases. Analysts affiliated to the investment banks that 
served   as   Tiscali’s   advisors   kept   issuing   positive  
recommendations when it was quite clear, at least 
analysts working for other brokers, that the 
company’s   perspectives   were   definitely   not   good   at  
all. While, more in general, the uncertainty 
surrounding internet companies real value was 
definitely high at the time, also behavioral biases like 
excessive optimism and overconfidence distorted 
analysts’  valuations  as  well  as  decision  heuristics  such  
as anchoring.  
Right around the bubble peak, analyst tended to 
use only relative valuation, first using multiples based 
on   companies’   fundamentals,   then   the   number   of  
subscribers or of pages viewed to determine their 
value. These methods proved to be erroneous. This 
was   particularly   the   case   in   respect   of   those   “new”  
multipliers   that   did   not   take   the   companies’  
fundamentals to find their value, but were based on 
potential growth perspectives. More in general, as the 
behavioral finance literature has pointed out, these 
methods can be classified as valuation heuristics, 
often based on intuition rather than on rigorous 
scientific methods, like the Discounted Cash Flows 
approach. Intuition is important, but often leads to 
mistakes,   and   the   analysts’   reports   demonstrated in 
the bubble period, when they dramatically 
overestimate the real value of internet companies. 
After the bubble burst, in 2001, analysts started 
using DCF again, but often together with market 
multiples, thus not eliminating the behavioral traps of 
these latter methods. 
Finally, the results found applying the event 
study analysis demonstrates that investors behaved 
irrationally, influenced by the general euphoria on the 
internet sector, and not basing their investment 
decisions  on  companies’  fundamentals. Analyzing the 
market reaction to the issuance of recommendations 
following   Tiscali’s   acquisitions   announcements,   it  
seems that analysts did not convey value to investors. 
This could be explained be the fact that the market 
could have finally understood that analysts were 
overly optimistic in their valuations.  
The case of Tiscali serves for more general 
considerations. This clinical study has underline the 
importance of considering the psychological biases 
affecting  analysts’  valuations.  Analysts  need  insert in 
their toolbox the new instruments provided by 
behavioral finance to avoid the traps of certain (not 
scientifically based) techniques. Also, it is important 
to understand the cognitive and emotional aspects 
affecting the behavior of individual investors. 
Without   this   understanding,   financial   markets’  
behavior will remain a black box for those who still 
think that the traditional approach is enough. 
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